Stem Cells: The Ethical Problems of Using Embryos for Research by Mieth, Dietmar
Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1985-2015) 
Volume 22 Issue 2 Article 9 
2006 
Stem Cells: The Ethical Problems of Using Embryos for Research 
Dietmar Mieth 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jchlp 
Recommended Citation 
Dietmar Mieth, Stem Cells: The Ethical Problems of Using Embryos for Research, 22 J. Contemp. Health L. 
& Pol'y 439 (2006). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jchlp/vol22/iss2/9 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1985-2015) by an authorized editor of CUA 
Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
STEM CELLS: THE ETHICAL PROBLEMS OF
USING EMBRYOS FOR RESEARCH*
Dietmar Mieth
STEM CELLS IN THE CONTEXT OF ASSISTED PROCREATION
The term "stem cells" has become a magic password to enter a medical
utopia where physicians will be able to overcome all human ailments once
and for all. The hope for this "brave new world" comes from tiny cells that
are undifferentiated yet but can develop in many different directions. By
directing their growth and development, biologists could potentially use
them to grow therapeutic "spare parts" to treat diabetes, Parkinson's disease
or heal paralyzed persons-just to name a few uses of this technology. In the
most extreme vision of this future, even aging and death could finally be
defeated as failing organs would be replaced by new ones freshly grown
from stem cells. Although these goals are not yet within reach, they have
already triggered intense medical research and have drawn interest from the
public and the bio-pharmaceutical industry.
But the promises of stem cell research are overshadowed by serious
ethical questions that result from one origin of these cells: the human
embryo at an early stage of development. At the moment, the only
embryonic sources are aborted or spare embryos left over from in vitro
fertilization. It is this method of stem cell generation that has drawn the most
criticism. Medical treatments using embryonic stem cells are not yet
available, so the actual dilemma lies not their application but rather in the
direction of research that needs and consumes these cells now. Future
patients are mostly do not exist now, so that their future rights can be taken
into account and can then outweigh the embryonic resource, if the "value" of
an embryo is very weak. Is this the case?
If we want to pursue medical research using embryonic stem cells, we
have to resolve the problems that the extraction of these cells from a human
embryo brings with it.
It is political or a language-related problem that the area of medicine in
question here is increasingly described as "reproductive medicine." When
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reproductive medicine first became available, it was clear that its scope was
limited to helping couples suffering from infertility. This scope was in no
way related to generating embryos in vitro as a resource for biomedical
research. Is it deception, indifference, the promotion of deregulation, or
naivet6 that now lumps together in vitro fertilization and prenatal diagnosis
with research on embryonic stem cells under the heading of "reproductive
medicine?"
The debate about the ethics of stem cell research has reached an
international level and has spurred more widespread concern about
biomedical research in general. The failure of society fully to address and
resolve these questions is reflected in the differences of interim regulations
that have been adopted in various countries. In the United States, research
that uses embryos as material cannot be financed with public funding.
Regulations differ widely in Great Britain and Germany because Great
Britain, in its Embryo Protection Law, protects by procedures, which do not
protect the single embryo under the criterion of "respect for life." Germany,
on the contrary, in its Embryo Protection Law "covers" the single embryo
under the criterion of dignity. Belgium and other European countries are
now adopting regulations for the generation and use of stem cells and other
in vitro questions. Other European countries like Greece or Italy are still
missing special laws in this field. Neither has the Council of Europe decided
on guidelines; the Supplementary Protocol to the Convention on
Biomedicine on the Protection of the Embryo has not yet been written.
Some things are happening, but the outcome of the ethical debate is still
open.
The discussion about ethical concerns has started (in Germany) with the
problems that arise from the physical removal of stem cells from a blastula.
The first question is whether these cells themselves should be considered
embryos because they are totipotent and can become "anything." Or should
they be considered just cells because they are still capable of a number of
developments but not of developing into a fetus if they are implanted in a
womb? If we were to deny that these cells had the ability to develop into
human beings, then we would need to exclude them from the discussion
about the protection of the embryo.
And what about the embryos which are used for these kinds of
experiments? Can the removal of stem cells damage an embryo? Where
experiments on embryos have been permitted and pursued, the non-
implantation has been seen as the logical consequence, indeed as the ethical
imperative because of the possibility that they might have been damaged
during the removal of stem cells. The final answer to these questions is
difficult to verify and cannot be decided by the ethicist alone but rather can
be resolved only through discussion with scientists.
The most important point and the one that lies at the heart of the ethical
controversy about stem cells is the question of what morally relevant status a
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human embryo possesses. Can we simply treat embryos as a biological
resource that can be generated in vitro and exploited to produce stem cells
just because they are the only source of this valuable commodity? Until now,
fertilization in the test tube has been used to help childless couples have
children and not to create embryos for the purpose of research. But clearly
the removal of stem cells after so-called "therapeutic cloning" that is
undertaken solely for research purposes opens the door to a liberalization of
laws regulating in vitro fertilization. We, as a society, will have to consider
and discuss the social and ethical questions that arise with this kind of
research.
So, what is a fertilized egg, what is an early embryo? The Convention on
Biomedicine of the Council of Europe offers three possible answers, all
mentioned in the Supplementary Protocol on Human Cloning: an embryo is
a person, a human being, or a conglomerate of human cells. I suggest that
the last possibility be excluded, because there is indeed a significant
difference between human gametes and an early embryo. The embryo has a
gender. This characteristic is used for sex selection, even for so-called
"social sexing" without relation to a monogenetic disease (e.g., 28 babies in
Europe in 2001). The embryo has the ability-and not merely in the sense
of an abstract potential, but in the sense of a real capacity-to become a
human being if its development is allowed to follow its inherent intention.
The common objection that "nature" does not implant all fertilized egg cells
does not count in this context because "nature" cannot be treated as a
morally responsible subject. Anyone who is not prepared to accept the
cruelty of "nature" as an ethically restrictive argument should not use it as a
normative argument for indifference either.
If, however, we are dealing with an embryo as a human being, we must
consider its morally relevant status. If we do so, can we maintain on the
basis of this status that every embryo is the bearer of individual rights that
would preclude its destruction or even its being put at risk? My point of
view is that simply belonging to the human species already entails a
particular right to protection, which transcends that applied to animals.
Those who do not want to protect embryos individually, but would rather
protect them only as a particular kind of "biological material" that has to be
treated with respect but could be used for research, therefore, violate, in my
opinion, the morally relevant status of a human being.
But is the problem not larger than this? The Catholic Church assumes that
an embryo has to be treated "like a person." This formulation is carefully
worded to the extent that it does not simply maintain that embryos are
identical with persons. The Church argues that we cannot make a distinction
between "human beings" and "persons" and assign them to two different
levels because the development of a human being is a unified and
continuous process. This development can be distinguished but it cannot be
broken into different phases. Indeed, it would have unpredictable
consequences for the human society if we began to distinguish between
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human beings on the basis of the stage of their development. The moral
inviolability of humans results also from the reflection that we are as
humans not allowed to define others as humans in the moral sense or not if
they exist naturally as humans. The consequence of the moral inviolability
of a human being and its development is a morally relevant status that grants
the embryo a fully valid protection of life. This does not allow them to be
used up for research that treats them as raw material. If this moral status is
respected, then life as the most fundamental right cannot be weighed against
other highly ranked goods such as saving the life of a not yet existing
patient.
In the absence of statements in this area found in Revelation, each
theological position can only be argued philosophically. This means
inherently that it can also be attacked philosophically. On the other hand,
one specific theological argument for the position of the Catholic Church is
that tying a notion of personhood to cognitive qualities does not correspond
to the Christian tradition that sees every human being as accepted by God.
Different perceptions of the status of an embryo found at present within the
Christian community must be further discussed (see below), but it is
significant that theologians can explicate their Christian convictions by
philosophical arguments.
It seems to me, however, that differences in form of argumentation over
theological convictions are less important than the attempt to excuse
research on human embryos by referring to ailments and suffering of
patients. The normative power, which this effort to excuse accords a
scientific fiction corresponds to an instrumentalization of the hopes of
patients. As a colleague with Parkinson (a microbiologist) pointed out,
patients lose time to illusory hopes instead of using it for their present
possibilities of restricted but real life.
There is a tendency among the supporters of research, which uses
embryos as raw material, to draw absolutes from medical options and
potential therapeutic benefits. But research uses up material now
irrecoverably. The interests of sufferers from an illness are important, but
they must not be made into absolutes to force a society that has to be
committed to all moral values to foreshorten its perspective. Social solidarity
with the sick and the suffering, which assigns necessary and valuable
resources to biomedical research, must also set priorities of these resources.
But we hear often the "why not?" of those who hold a so-called
gradualistic concept of the status of the embryo. In this context religious
traditions are often mentioned, among them the so called "successive
animation," which seems to be found in Jewish, Muslim, and Christian
history. Even though evidence shows that these theories, if real, took shape
prior to the Enlightenment and before modem biology discovered the female
egg (in 1827), the "forty-days" argument as a cultural tradition (altered
however with respect to the question of different animation of male and
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female), influences the content of present law, e.g., in Israel. Therefore, in
the following paragraphs I will examine this kind of tradition and its
meaning.
"SUCCESSIVE ANIMATION" IN THE TRADITION OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH-
A CONTRIBUTION TO THE DISCUSSION ON THE STATUS OF THE EMBRYO
Gradualism often is used to assert that potentiality derived from human
embryos is not the same as actuality (reality). It is true that there is a long
philosophical tradition of "succession" of different stages: Aristotle, Thomas
Aquinas. But does this kind of "gradualism" mean the same as a
chronological succession? Is so-called potentiality sufficient for a
recognition as a human being? Is every human being a subject that has
rights to respect for its inviolability? The answer of Aristotle, often quoted
by Ludger Honnefelder, that a living being, which has the potentiality to
become an entity, must be treated like the being which it is becoming, is
often not considered as solving the problem.
My hypothesis is that gradualism is to be understood in the context of law
and the rules against abortion, which have a long history in Jewish,
Christian, and Muslim traditions. The question was, how it can be proved
that a fetus, respectively an embryo, is a human being. I think that the legal
context may be a good explanation of the problem: the fact of an abortion
can only be proved if we can see it in an empirical approach that the embryo
is formed like a child. In this context we have to take into account, that in
the whole tradition before 1827, the human egg was unknown. The
anatomist Niels Stensen had discovered the female egg of a whale in the
17th century but this remained without great consequences, because the
analogy that he saw to mammals and to the humans was not proved.
Aristotle had, for a long time, a major influence on biology. But Aristotle
was interested in the question of at what time we can see or feel the first
motions of the embryo. This might have been the reason why he speaks of
the formation of the embryo and, in this context, at 40 or 80 days. But it is
not be equated with the beginning of the existence of an embryo.
When we find in the Jewish tradition Rabbi Ishmael, and, later on, the
Talmud, reflecting on the formation of the embryo, Ishmael proves that
formation by reference to an experiment of Queen Cleopatra, in which
pregnant slaves were killed and the formation of the future child was proved
in the different stages of pregnancy.
The tradition of law seems to have converged with religious authority,
starting with the exegesis of the book Exodus 21: 22-23, where a case is
regulated: the case of an abortion provoked by the circumstances of a fight.
This case is to be understood in two traditions: on one side by the strong
Jewish tradition of the interdiction of abortion, which we can find by Philo,
by Flavius Josephus, by the quoted Rabbi Ishmael, and in the Kabala
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(Sohar). On the other side, this case of an abortion provoked by a fight was
translated in the Hellenistic and Middle Eastern context of law. The Greek
bible, the Septuagint, made the distinction between an embryo, in which we
can recognize the human form, and an embryo, which cannot empirically, by
the unaided senses, be seen as a human being. I see this as a proof of my
hypothesis, that this interpretation is following the law tradition that can be
seen also in Babylonian and in Hethitic texts (not only Hellenistic but
ancient Middle Eastern).
In the Christian tradition, which is unanimous in its interdiction of
abortion, Augustine recalls that we do not know when the human being
begins in the womb. But, in doing so, he is countering a theory that
combines the first motion of the embryo with its beginning. Augustine
introduces as criterion the "complete form" (forma completa, but this in
contradiction to an other theory anima concepta).
In the context of the first general collection of Church Law (Codex
Gratian), we will find the 40/80 day threshold. The reason that is given by
this law collection is the same as by Rabbi Ishmael: because after a birth the
woman had to undergo different regulations of purification different for
male and female children, the development of these children must also be
different. Thus, the foundation of the distinction can be characterized as
metaphorical and as a social construction following social patterns. The
question whether human life begins with conception or with formation is
discussed in the Treatise Sanhedrine, in which Rabbi Jehuda confessed to be
convinced by a dialogue with the Emperor Antoninus that the conception
must be the beginning. In summary, religious sources indicate that we do
not have a specific religious answer, because they shift between the answers
of philosophy and the necessities of law in which every fact must be proved.
My central question now is, should we assume that Thomas Aquinas, who
is the leading figure in the Catholic tradition of moral theology, teaches the
theory of chronological and successive animation as is maintained by some
interpretations and receptions like Karl Rahner's, or at least by Raphael
Schulte in the new Lexikon Mr Theologie und Kirche ("Encyclopedia of
Theology and Church") and by Ted Peters in the Protestant Religion in
Geschichte und Gegenwart ("Encyclopedia of Religion Contemporary and
Historical"). If we take the often quoted fundamental text of Thomas
Aquinas, it seems to me that the interpretation of a chronological successive
animation is totally wrong. Thomas Aquinas had quite other interests than a
chronological description of ontogenesis in humans. His description is an
ontological or "vertical" process, but not a temporal development of
animation. Thomas Aquinas wanted to explain that the material has not the
capacity to bring into life the soul. He had not a monistic but a dualistic
world view. He wanted to show, that every human being is created by God
immediately, insofar as God implants the soul and not the parents. His
interest in this case was the freedom of every human person from the
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determination by a plan or a design made by the parents. He is interested in
autonomy of every human being.
For him the three elements in the soul-vegetative, sensitive,
intellectual-are only complements of the substance that only exists by
reason of the specific intellectual soul. These components do not exist one
after the other; they are, on the contrary, organized by the specific human
soul, and as such they do not exist before the intellectual soul. Thomas
Aquinas refers not to the doctrine of act and potency, but the doctrine of
"hylomorphism," which means that the form dominates the pure deposition
by the material. In other words, the construction of the beginning of the
human being is not chronologically defined but interpreted metaphorically.
The vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual souls are not chronological grades
but ontological stages. They must be seen in a vertical order.
CONCLUSION
I hope to have clarified that there is no chronological successive theory of
animation in the Catholic tradition. "Successive animation" refers to a
difference between ethics and law, not in the religious church, but only in
the Christian societies. This derivation of the law has nothing to do with
religious authority, but much to do with the question of when the existence
of a new human being can be proved as a fact without doubt before a court
who has to decide whether a homicide has occurred or not. In this tradition
present German Law, for example, does not prohibit birth control including
the pill interfering with innidation. But in the context of embryo protection
in vitro it defines the beginning of a human being with the fertilized egg. If
this is the starting point, the derivation of human embryonic stem cells
remains an ethical and juridical problem. To outweigh this fundamental
point of view for the sake of a speculative future benefit to not yet existing
patients seems ethically nearly impossible.
It may be seen as a paradox that, in the same time as an embryo in vitro
was successfully developed, uncertainty about the beginning of a human
being-a question in suspense at the last major meeting of European moral
theologians in 1973 in Strasbourg-seemed to be resolved. But immediately
a new question was bom and now remains in suspense: is every human
being, as a member of the human species, also a person equipped with
human rights? I wonder if a religion derived from the Bible can deny that
this is so. The alternative is, that we have the right to define who is a
person. In a religious view this right belongs to God, and God has decreed
that there is no difference between a human being and a person. So the
question comes back: is the embryo in vitro a human being?
Several conditions can be enumerated, as a minimum, to the eligibility of
a religious answer's compatibility with religious traditions and with their
philosophical translation:
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No ascription of personhood by qualities which are not given with the
existence of a human being;
No insistence on a complete form of a human being; and,
No chronological graduality.
These reflections may make it plausible, why the Catholic Church is
following only the principle of precaution (or tutiorism) in saying that the
early embryo in vitro must be treated "as a person." But the presupposition
remains that this embryo is a product of egg and sperm. We are now in the
position to ask: what about the other embryos derived from other
combinations? When is an embryo an embryo? This is the philosophical
question in relation to in vitro cloning and other variants of embryonic
entities.
Even if we reject in vitro cloning of embryos to clone organs from stem
cells-either because the therapy to justify it has not been developed or just
because such manipulation opens the door to cloning of babies-arguments
have been developed to counter the objection to utilizing cloned embryos for
research which are to be regarded as human. These counterarguments must
be carefully examined. Biology, however, can only provide the evidence-
the evaluation is philosophical. Even theologians can argue only on a
philosophical basis.
The argument against the early embryo protection principle, which
prohibits in vitro cloning, is that an embryo cloned using the Dolly method
cannot be considered the same as an embryo defined as the completed union
of sperm and egg cells. The cloned embryo is a fusion of egg cells without
nuclei (of human or even animal origin) and human stem cells come from
the person whose clone it is, and other stem cells and organs are created
from them. While-extrapolating the Dolly process to cover human
beings--"natural" embryos and "cloned" embryos, or combined embryonic
entities, may have the same chances of developing into human beings, their
origins are vastly different. It should be pointed out that it is strictly
forbidden to implant cloned embryos, although as yet this is just a
recommended moratorium in the United States (under the 1997 Clinton
Commission).
So, is an embryo, if not imitating the natural reproduction, not an embryo
with a right to human dignity as is assumed for embryos resulting from the
union of sperm an egg cells? This is a key question, particularly, for
example, for those who have strict positions against the manipulation of
embryos in vitro. If the status of the embryo depends wholly on the
argument regarding its potential (to become a baby), the moral status of a
cloned embryo is the same as that of a "natural" embryo. However, if its
status depends on its originating from a natural, albeit assisted fertilization,
as well as the potential to become and its development into a human, the
status of a cloned embryo, would for example, be different.
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Setting out this problem raises another question: have we the right to
equate a cloned embryo with a natural embryo in order to manipulate it? For
we must distinguish between the question of whether a manufactured
embryo has the same status as an assisted "natural" embryo, and the question
of whether we should be allowed to create an embryo with the same
potential but a different origin (or whether attempts already made in some
countries should have been allowed). If the latter question would produce a
negative answer, in doing so, it bring us back to the counterargument raised
at the beginning against clones that are wrongly termed "therapeutic;" we
manipulate something in order to destroy it for something that is not yet
there and cannot be guaranteed (the therapy) and continue to risk opening
the door to reproductive cloning. This is why we can only call for an
examination of all alternatives to the embryo-cloning method and other
methods to create embryos for different purposes.
The situation would be different, if the cloned embryo was not merely not
allowed to develop to term as a human being, but also could not do so. Once
again, this question can be examined only with the help of biological
evidence. Experiments on animals interpreted in the same way could be
used, as could the biological prognosis for chimera embryos (from human
stem cells and animal egg cells). If the argument with the slippery slope
towards human cloning could be countered on biological grounds, the
argument about potential would lose its plausibility (a strong Catholic
opposition can still object to the manipulation of fertility). Yet here too we
need further research, which would have to push back the authorization to
clone in vitro embryos, logically at least until the question has been
answered. We must understand that, at present, cloning raises more
questions than we can answer and these questions cannot be swept under the
carpet or ignored simply on grounds of euphoric expectations. Thus far, we
have not succeeded in getting to the bottom of such questions, either when
estimating consequences or in our philosophical and moral evaluation. Even
if opinions differ about the status of embryos, there should be one rule for
the future: problems should not be resolved in such a way that the problems
arising from the solution are greater than the problems solved.
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